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SECURITIES LAW - UNCOLLATERALIZED PROMISSORY
NOTES ARE CONSIDERED "SECURITIES" TO BE
REGULATED UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Often, amid the intricate passages of federal securities regulation, I an important term or phrase escapes precise formulation. 2
Undoubtedly, the definition of a security contained in the securities
acts 3 represents just such a passage. Before Reves v. Ernst & Young,4
the Supreme Court had declined to address the issue of whether
notes S are securities. 6 This allowed federal circuit courts to create and
1. In this casenote, "securities regulation" or the "securities acts" refer to both
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)
[hereinafter 1933 Act] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78a-78kk (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1934 Act], as well as the
applicable rules and regulations of each Act. The term "security" refers to the
investment instruments which are regulated by the Security Act of 1933 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
2. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 720 (1975)
(securities laws are interpreted in a manner most conducive to the effectuation
of the statute's goals); SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)
(meaning of particular phrases in securities laws must be determined in context);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (the 1934 Act is remedial
legislation which should be broadly construed).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(1) & 78c(a)(1O) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
4. Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
5. For purposes of this casenote, the term "note" means an instrument commonly
defined as a written promise to pay a specified amount to a certain entity
either on demand or on a specified date. See J. DOWNES & J. GOODMAN,
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (1985).
At common law, several cases attempted to define the term "note." See,
e.g., Kirkland v. Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 728, 155 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1967)
("[t]he word 'note' is defined as a written paper acknowledging a debt and
promising payment"); Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. v. Brown, 141 So. 436,
439 (La. 1932) ("A note is a written engagement or promise to pay a certain
sum of money at a time specified. It is the evidence of an obligation to pay.").
See also Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act 0/ 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act 0/ 1934, 36 MD. L. REv. 233, 236 n.13 (1976)
[hereinafter, Comment, Notes as Securities].
6. See, e.g., Futura Dev. Co. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enters.,
Inc. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973).
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apply their own tests to determine whether a note is a security subject
to federal regulation. 7 A variety of tests emerged from the federal
circuits leading the Supreme Court in Reves to attempt to define the
scope of the term in the context of notes. 8
In Reves, the Eighth Circuit determined that the demand promissory notes in question were not securities because they lacked the
characteristics of a security.9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the demand notes were subject to federal securities regulation.
The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would be inconsistent
with congressional intent in enacting the securities laws. 1o
In its decision, the Court not only established the test for
determining whether a note instrument is a "security" under the
securities acts, but it also found that the promissory demand note at
issue did not fall within the exemption under federal securities laws ll

7. Most federal courts agree that some notes definitely do not fall under securities
regulation, such as notes securing home mortgages. On the other hand, notes
issued as investments to the public in order to raise capital are usually held to
be securities. Difficulty arises when attempting to develop a practical test for
determining the status of notes that fall between these two obvious extremes.
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA.
L. REv. 400, 403 (1982) [hereinafter Note, The Economic Realities of Defining
Notes as Securities); see also Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene
Security, A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEX. TECH L. REv.
25, 26 (1975) (tests used by the courts to define whether a note is a security
are subjective and impractical). See infra notes 37-66 and accompanying text
for discussion of the various tests applied by the federal circuit courts of
appeals.
8. Prior to the Reves decision, no common test was employed by the circuits to
determine whether a note instrument was a security. See infra notes 37-66 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the various tests applied. In order to
avoid these problems, the Supreme Court applied a specific test in order to
clarify what types of notes would not be considered to have the characteristics
of securities. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
9. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub
nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). The Eighth Circuit applied
the test developed in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (known
as the Howey test) and found that the demand nature of the notes was "very
uncharacteristic of a security." Id. Thus, the appellate court concluded that
the notes were not securities within the meaning of either the federal or
Arkansas securities laws. Id. at 54-55.
10. Reves, 494 U.S. at 73. The application of the Howey test to notes was rejected
by the Supreme Court, finding that the test was designed primarily for
investment contracts and not notes. Id. at 64-67.
11. In § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, "[a)ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers'
acceptance ... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months" is exempted from the provisions of the Act. 15 U .S.C.A. §
77c(a)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). However, in § 3(a)(IO) of the 1934 Act,
"[t)he term 'security' ... shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
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for notes with a maturityl2 exceeding nine months at the time of
issuance. Although the determination of what test to apply will create
uniformity, this test, as well as the plurality'sl3 decision as to the
maturity issue, creates more problems than it purports to resolve.
1991)

II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Securities Acts

After the collapse of the stock market in 1929, Congress l4 enacted
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to bolster investor confidence in the securities markets by providing
federal protection against fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative
practices, which were thought t6 have contributed to the collapse. IS

12.
13.

14.

15.

exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(lO) (West 1988 & Supp.
1991).
The term "maturity" refers to the date on which the principal amount of a
debt instrument becomes due and payable. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra
note 5.
Only four Justices (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Kennedy) joined in the
determination that the maturity of the Co-op's demand notes was not immediate
and, therefore, the notes were not excluded from regulation under the securities
acts. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion on this issue.
State regulation of securities predated the adoption of the federal securities
acts. Kansas was the first to adopt state securities regulation in 1911, followed
by Arizona and Louisiana in 1912. The constitutionality of state regulation of
securities markets through the blue sky laws was established in Hall v. GeigerJones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). These state statutes are called "blue sky laws"
due to the Kansas promoter who was selling "lots in the blue sky in fee simple
absolute." See R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS, 334 (1989)
(citing Mulvy, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916»; see also H.
BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SECURITIES LAW, § 2.02 (1990-91) (fifty-one American jurisdictions require regulation of securities; the District of Columbia does
not).
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (Necessity for Regulation) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991);
S. REp. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1979); see also Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (aim of 1934 Act includes the deterrence
of fraud and manipulative practices in securities markets and full disclosure of
information material for investment decisions); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 555 (1982) (1934 Act was adopted to restore investors' confidence);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (1933 Act was designed
to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning
public offerings of securities to protect investors against fraud); Radzanower
v~ Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (primary purpose of the 1934
Act was to provide fair and honest mechanism for pricing of securities and to
assure that dealing in securities was fair); United Housing Found., Inc. v.
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Both statutes emphasize disclosure by issuers of information material
to investors, but regulate different securities markets. 16 Exemptions
from registration are also available under both Acts. 17
The threshold issue of whether a note is subject to federal
securities regulations can be crucial to a defrauded investor, as well
as the alleged fraud perpetrator .18 Unless the instrument involved is
a security, certain anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act are
inapplicable l9 and no other federal regulation exists to determine
liability.20

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (fundamental purpose of the Securities Acts
was "to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market");
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (central purpose of the 1934
Act was to protect investors by requiring full disclosure from issuers of
securities).
The 1933 Act focuses on regulating public offerings of securities (the "primary
market"). In contrast, the 1934 Act oversees trading on the "secondary market"
by regulating those that are listed on national stock exchanges. HAMILTON,
supra note 14, at 334-35 (1989).
Small corporations strive to structure their capital-raising to take advantage of
an exemption to the registration requirements, due to the expense and complex
nature of filing. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 335.
For an investor it is somewhat easier to establish fraud under the civil liability
provisions of the federal securities acts than under common law theories of
fraud. See Comment, Notes as Securities; supra note 5, at 233 n.4; Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud
Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1568 (1980) ("Parties seeking federal securities
law jurisdiction in note cases do so primarily to avail themselves of the
advantages afforded by the federal antifraud provisions as compared to remedies provided by state commercial law, contract law, blue sky law, corporation
law, or common law fraud actions. ").
Additionally, an action under the securities regulations provides access to
a federal forum. Possible advantages of the federal forum include more liberal
discovery procedures and the possibility for judges and juries that may have a
greater degree of sophistication, due to the location of federal courts in large
urban areas.
Although there are several anti-fraud provisions in the securities acts, the most
frequently litigated provision is Rule IOb-5 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78j (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter Rule lOb-51, which broadly prohibits
employment of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. See also infra note 33 for application of the
anti-fraud provisions under the 1933 Act.
See Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 234. Before 1975, the most
distinctive advantage to pursuing a private right of action under Rule IOb-5
was that a plaintiff's recovery did not depend upon proof of reliance or
scienter. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), established a requirement of scienter. See
Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 234. Advantages of bringing
suit under Rule IOb-5 are that: 1) the class of persons that may be sued is
much broader than under a common law fraud action; 2) a plaintiff can obtain
nationwide venue and service of process; and 3) shareholder derivative suits

Reves v. Ernst & Young
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B.
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The definitions of securities in the securities acts merely list
general types of instruments that are considered securities. 21 Judicial
interpretation is required when an instrument does not precisely match
an item on the list. 22 In fact, the problem of determining whether a
particular instrument is a security is implied in Congress' inclusion
of the phrase, "or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security," '23 at the end of the list of items in the
definition. The use of this phrase has led courts to broadly construe
the definition of a security. 24 Even though greater problems exist in
using a broad (rather than a precise) definition,2s the Supreme Court
has respected Congress' approach.26

may be brought without providing security for the expenses of the defendant.
[d. at 233 (citations omitted).

21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

In recent years, however, the requirements for successful civil liability
actions under the anti-fraud provisions have been tightened by the Supreme
Court. Currently, there are several requirements imposed for Rule IOb-5 private
actions. For. example, the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of the
company's stock during the time of non-disclosure. See Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A material fact which was relied
upon by the plaintiff must have been misstated or omitted by the defendant,
although materiality and reliance may be proved by a "fraud on the market"
theory. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988). Scienter or malicious
intent on the part of defendant must be proved. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, i93 (1976). Also, the transaction must have involved
manipulative or deceptive practices. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 473-74 (1977).
See infra note 27 for the definitions of a security contained in the 1933 and
the 1934 Acts.
No actual test is provided in the statutory definitions, so the courts are left to
establish their own criteria for determining whether an instrument falls within
the definition of the statutes.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77(b)(I) & 78(c)(a)(IO) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
See Note, Definition of a Security: Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 40 Sw.
L.J. 879, 881 (1986) (because Congress has failed to describe the characteristics
that distinguish securities from nonsecurities, courts have fashioned their own
concepts of what the definitions cover); see also Ballard & Cordell Corp. v.
Zoller & Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1063, (10th Cir. 1976)
(definition of a security is to be liberally construed, with the courts looking to
the substance rather than the form of the transaction), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
965 (1977); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852,854 (9th Cir. 1953) (definition
of a security should not be narrowly construed), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923
(1954).
.
In recent years, federal courts have been inundated with securities litigation.
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note
7, at 402-03 n.17. This expanding caseload is a valid consideration when
determining the scope of note transactions being defined as securities. See
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Both Acts define "security" in a similarly broad manner. 27 In
fact, the courts have consistently treated the definitions as substantially identical. 28 There are, however, two differences in the Acts that
relate to notes. 29 First, the 1933 Act's definition includes the term

26.

27.

28.

29.

Comment, The Status oj the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 175, 183 (1975).
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990). This approach was
adopted in an effort to ensure that both the SEC and the courts have sufficient
flexibility to continue protection of investors through application of the securities laws to new instruments that may not be expressly listed in the statutory
definition of a "security". Id.
The 1933 Act's definition of a security states:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires (1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,· or other mineral
rights, ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 V.S.C.A. § 77b(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
The 1934 Act's definition of a security states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, or treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, ... or in general, any instrument
commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(1O) (West 1988
& Supp. 1991).
See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 n.l; Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471
U.S. 681, 686 n.l (1985); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 77677 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th
Cir. 1977); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (1Oth Cir. 1974); see also
Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1573. But cj. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551 (1982) (concluding that the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act did
not cover a certificate of deposit and "unique agreement, negotiated one-onone by the parties," since these instruments were not considered securities).
The Weaver Court, however, did not address the issue of whether it would
reach the same conclusion when applying the 1933 Act definition of a security.
See Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1572-73.
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"evidence of indebtedness" which is not present in the 1934 Act. 30
Second, the 1934 Act excludes from the 'definition of a security "any
note ... which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months ... ",31 whereas the 1933 Act definition includes such
short-term notes, but exempts them from some of the more burdensome regulations of the 1933 Act, such as registration. 32 This exemption in the 1933 Act effectively provides the same type of exclusion
of short-term notes as does the definitional section of the 1934 Act.
The distinction between the exemption in the 1933 Act and the
exclusion under the 1934 Act, however, is significant. 33
Determining whether a specific note is a security is more arduous
than ascertaining whether stocks fall within the definition; the latter
being instruments more readily identified as securities.34 Notes take
on various forms based on the assorted types of transactions in which
1991]

30. The significance of this technical difference is "probably negligible with respect
to anti-fraud coverage." Sonnenschein, supra note 18, at 1573. The three
reasons given for this conclusion are: 1) the definitions of security in the 1933
and 1934 Acts are virtually identical according to Supreme Court; 2) since the
majority of actions are brought under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act, parties
would gain little by alleging the existence of an item which is not facially
covered by the 1934 Act; and 3) the "evidence of indebtedness" language has
been interpreted to provide equal statutory treatment for instruments which
are deemed not to be notes. [d.
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(a)(10) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
32. The full text of § 3(a)(3) states:
(a) Ex~ept as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this
title shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been
or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.
For further discussion of the "maturity exception," see infra text accompanying
notes 67-76.
33. If an instrument is exempt under the 1933 Act from registration requirements,
such a security would nonetheless remain subject to the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1933 Act. See § 12(2) and § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 771(2)
& 77q. If an instrument is excluded under the 1934 Act from the definition of
a security, however, the instrument is not subject to any provisions (including
the anti-fraud provisions) of the 1934 Act. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra
note 14, § 4.04 at 64.
34. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.01(1) at 48; Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985) (traditional stock is more susceptible
to a plain-meaning approach than notes). But see United Housing Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease
an apartment in co-op were not considered to be securities since the shares did
not meet the investment contract criteria found in SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S.
293 (1946».
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they are issued; consequently, they have been troublesome to categorize. 35 Although not always agreeing as to the characterization of
types of notes, most courts have concluded that there are some notes
that definitely do not fit the "security" definition, such as notes
securing home mortgages. 36
C.

Two Problem Areas

1.

What Test Should be Applied to Notes?

The federal courts' use. of a test by which notes should be
characterized has varied over the years. 37 In cases decided before
1971, courts usually held all note instruments to be securities without
applying any specific test. 38 Recently, federal courts have applied as
35. See, e.g., Smith Int'l., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1201
(5th Cir. 1988) (promissory notes issued by debtor corporation were not
"securities" within meaning of federal securities laws, where notes were issued
for corporation's pre-existing debt under financial restructuring plan); Union
Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 884-85 (8th Cir.
1986) (bank's 100070 participation in unsecured note held by another bank was
not a "security" for purposes of federal securities law due to short-term
nature); Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 493 (7th
Cir. 1984) (note bearing fixed rate of interest and having only a one year term
to maturity was a "security" within the meaning of federal law); Davis v.
Avco Fin. Services, 739 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1984) (promissory notes
executed to finance company by investors, evidencing loans to them by finance
company, were not considered "securities" within the meaning of federal
securities law), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985). See a/so Annotation,
Promissory Notes as Securities, 39 A.L.R. FED. 357, 365 (1978) ("Transactions
involving notes may generally be categorized as being either sales transactions
or loan transactions. ").
36. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of notes which
the courts do not consider to be securities.
37. Until the Reves decision, the Supreme Court had never specifically addressed
the issue of what test should be utilized in determining which note transactions
are securities. The federal courts applied several tests in order to comply with
the general Supreme Court guidelines for defining securities. See infra notes
38-66 and accompanying text.
38. See Note, The Economic Rea/ities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note
7, at 406; see a/so Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 235. See,
e.g., Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953) (promissory notes
exchanged for funds to be bet on "fixed" volley ball game), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 923 (1954); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (notes
issued as loan to finance an expedition to retrieve "hidden monies"); Olympic
Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (personal note
issued by individual on behalf of corporation to another corporation); SEC v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (notes as loan to fund mining
operations); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958), afl'd per
curiam, 283 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1960) (note issued by corporation to stockholders).

1991]
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many as five different tests to analyze note transactions. The various
tests include: 1) Howey test; 2) literal approach; 3) family resemblance
test; 4) commercial/investment application; and 5) risk capital analysis.
The Supreme Court first articulated the Howey test in the context
of defining an "investment contract" in SEC v. W.J. Howey Company.39 Under this approach, substance overrides form and the circumstances of a transaction govern whether the transaction falls
under the control of the securities acts.4O Viewing the "economic
realities" of the transaction, the C~)Urt determined that the transactions were "investment contracts" within the meaning of the Securities Acts 41 because the scheme involved: 1) an investment of money,
2) in a common enterprise42 , 3) where the investor is led to expect
39. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, land sale contracts involving small portions
of a citrus grove were sold to business professionals as investments. Optional
service contracts were offered, (and accepted by a majority of the investors)
whereby the land remained in the possession of the grower to manage, operate
and control. The investors were solely dependent upon the efforts of the
growers for any profits from the investment. Id. at 299-301. See also Note,
The Continued Demise of the Howey Test: The Supreme Court Adopts the
"Family Resemblance Test" for Identifying Notes as Securities, 20 STETSON L.
REv. 613, 620-25 (1990) for a detailed discussion of the elements of the Howey
test.
40. See Comment, Notes as Securities, supra note 5, at 240-41; Note, Federal
Securities Laws Applicable to Sale of a Business Effectuated by a Stock Sale
of All the Business's Stock, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 310, 315 (1986).
41. The term "investment contract" is included in the definition of a security
under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 77(b)(I) & 78(c)(a)(IO).
The Howey test was the first case to articulate a definition for the term
"investment contract" and, thereby, expanded the federal securities laws to
include instruments that had not currently been viewed to fall within the
popular definition of a security. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946).
42. The circuits are split as to the meaning of this test. See Cox, HILLMAN &
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REOULAnoN 134 (1991). The two approaches include
the "vertical" and "horizontal" commonality tests. The vertical commonality
approach emphasizes the relationship between investors and the promoter. The
principal inquiry is whether the profits of the investor are dependent upon the
efforts of the promoter. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (fortunes of the investors were "inextricably tied to
the efficacy" of the promoters, since the promoters provided scripts for the
meetings to be conducted by investors and the guidelines on recruiting prospects
and consummating a sale).
On the other hand, the horizontal commonality approach emphasizes the
relationship between the investors. This approach usually entails a pooling of
investors' funds. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 682 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (court determined that pooling of
investors' interests is essential factor,.to the finding of an investment contract),
afl'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 3:"9 (1982); Hirk .v. Agri-Research Council,
Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretionary trading account was
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profits, 4) which come solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party.
The Howey test has been applied to many types of instruments. 43
In fact, the Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 44
stated that the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. "45 Since
the Forman case, the Eighth 46 and the District of Columbia47 circuits
have utilized the Howey test in analyzing note instruments.
The Second Circuit developed the "literal approach"48 and the
"family resemblance test. "49 The "literal approach" followed statu-

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.

not considered an investment contract because there was no pooling of the
funds of multiple investors).
See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificate of deposit
and a business agreement between two families was not considered a security
because the "unique agreement they negotiated was not designed to be traded
publicly"); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (non-contributory, compulsory
pension plan was not considered a security within the meaning of the securities
acts since the employee was not found to have made an "investment" in the
plan, but was merely "selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood");
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1978)
(franchise agreement with agent to provide and maintain catalog store at
agent's expense was not considered an investment contract since the franchisee's
contributions significantly and substantially affected the profits expected from
the enterprise); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1974) (sale of chinchillas involved the offering of investment contracts in
violation of securities acts, even though investors nominally participated in the
raising of the animals).
421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, the Court determined that shares of stock
entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-op City, a state subsidized,
nonprofit housing cooperative, were securities within the meaning of the
securities acts.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1988) (applied the
Howey test and determined that Co-op demand notes did not fall under
definition of security), rev'd sub nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990); Union Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 884-85 (8th Cir.
1986) (since participating bank, although holding 100070 participation in unsecured note held by another bank, had no prospect of capital appreciation from
any increased earnings in business of note's creator, the participation was not
considered a "security"); Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490
(8th Cir. 1984) (loan participation interest was not a security within the meaning
of the securities laws).
.
Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (shortterm promissory note given in exchange for funds advanced in anticipation of
securing a limited partnership interest was considered a "security" due to the
investment nature of the transaction).
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(plaintiff gave long and short-term promissory notes in a financing arrangement
for the purpose of acquiring defendant's optical business which the court
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tory language closely, presuming all notes to be securities. This
inflexible adherence to the literal language of the statute was at odds
with Howey. As a result, the Supreme Court rejected the literal
approach in the Forman decision. 50 The Court insisted that the
"economic realities" of each transaction be assessed in determining
the status of a note. 51
The Second Circuit then developed the "family resemblance test"
in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & CO. 52 This test attempted
to account for the economic realities of the transaction while increasing the predictability of whether the federal securities laws would
apply to a particular instrument. Because of. the mandate by the
Supreme Court in Forman that the economic realities of a transaction
must be considered, the Second Circuit stated that some notes, such
as those evidencing consumer financing or home mortgage notes,

49.
50.

51.

52.

considered to be a sale of securities subject to securities regulation), a//'d per
curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). The court reasoned:
Upon turning to § 3(a)(l0) of the 1934 Act, however, we find that it
provides, in unequivocal and all embracive language, that "[t]he term
'security' means any note . ... " This plain language, literally read,
clearly includes promissory notes of the type that are the subject of
the present suit.
Movie/ab, Inc., 321 F. Supp. at 808 (emphasis in original).
See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126,
1137 (2d Cir. 1976) (unsecured, subordinated notes purchased by bank considered to be securities).
421 U.S. 837 (1975). The Court was faced with the problem of determining
whether the purchase of shares of "stock" in a non-profit housing cooperative
in New York City came within the definition of a security under the securities
acts. The Supreme Court spurned the literal method and held that "the name
given to an instrument was not dispositive." Id. at 850. The Court bolstered
its decision by noting that the stock at issue lacked the attributes typically
associated with stock. For example, the stock did not entitle the purchaser to
anything more than a place to live, since the purpose was to provide the
purchaser of the stock with living accommodations, not dividends or other
benefits associated with the purchase of securities. Therefore, the Forman court
determined that, even though the instrument was called "stock," it was not a
security, within the meaning of the securities acts because it was purchased for
consumption, not investment, purposes.
See Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-50. In another decision, Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), the
Second Circuit viewed the economic realities of the transaction to determine
the status of a demand note. The court retreated from the strict literal approach,
due to the recent reversal by the Supreme Court on that issue and the fact
that demand notes are not covered literally under the securities regulations.
The Exchange court found that a collection of unsecured, subordinated notes
purchased from a brokerage firm by a bank which had maturity dates ranging
from twelve to eighteen months from issuance were considered to be within
the definition of a "security" under the federal securities laws. Exchange, 544
F.2d at 1138-39.
544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
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would not be subject to federal securities regulation. s3 The court then.
stated that "[w]hen a note does not bear a strong family resemblance
to these examples and has a maturity exceeding nine months, § 1O(b)
[anti-fraud provisions] of the 1934 Act should generally be held to
apply."s4
The "commercial/investment" test is similar to the Howey test. ss
The Federal Court of Appeals in the First,S6 Third,s, Fifth,s8 Seventh,S9
Tenth,60 and Eleventh61 circuits have adopted this test. The "com53. See Exchange, 544 F.2d at 1138. See infra note 101 for all of the types of
instruments, listed by the Exchange court, that are not considered to be
securities within the meaning of the securities acts.
54. Exchange, 544 F.2d at 1138.
55. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63; BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04, at
56.
56. See Futura Dev. Corp.· v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 41-42 (1st Cir.), cerl.
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985) (a promissory note given after one-on-one business
negotiations that resulted in an agreement to sell property was considered
primarily a commercial, rather than investment, transaction because it served
as substitute for purchase price and, therefore, was not subject to securities
regulation).
57. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir.) (general partnership
interest in brokerage firm was not a "security" within the meaning of the
Securities Acts), cerl. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (3d Cir. 1984); Lino v. City
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-96 (3d Cir. 1973) (licensee issuing personal
promissory notes for purchase of franchise arrangement was not considered to
be security).
58. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1201 (5th Cir.
1988) (promissory notes issued for corporation's pre-existing debt under financial restructuring plan by debtor corporation were not securities within meaning
of the securities acts, since neither notes nor pre-existing debt, which they
represented, had any investment nature apart from debtor's obligation. to pay
the specified interest and principal); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford,
495 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (notes issued to obtain bank loan were
not considered securities since the notes were issued in the context of a
commercial loan transaction).
59. See Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 488-92 (7th
Cir. 1984) (notes, bearing a fixed rate of interest and having a one-year term
to maturity, were "securities" within the meaning of the securities acts, where
the seller solicited members of the general public seeking passive return from
their capital, sale of the notes did not resemble a commercial loan transaction,
and in a series of communications, the seller referred to the note as an
"investment"); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465-66 (7th Cir.
1981) (sale of all stock in a business was not considered to be the sale of a
"security" for purposes of federal and state securities law); Lincoln Nat'l Bank
v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1979) (promissory notes given in
commercial loans were commercial rather than "investment" in character and,
therefore, were not considered "securities" under the Securities Acts).
60. See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 779-83 (10th
Cir. 1989) (passbook savings certificates and thrift certificates were considered
to be investments through the character of the underlying transactions and
were thus determined to be "securities"); Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669,
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mercial/investment" test requires a note to have some investment
characteristics. If the instrument has more of a "commercial" than
"investment" nature, it will not be considered a security. Factors to
consider in making this determination include: 1) the degree to which
profit is in the hands of the maker rather than payee; 2) whether
th~ purpose of the holder is to acquire interest in property or an
enterprise; 3) whether note served as cash substitute for purchase
price; and 4) whether the return on note was predetermined. 62
Another test frequently used in fixing the definition of a security
is the "risk capital analysis," also known as the "corporate involvement test." This test, like the Howey test, focuses on the relationship
between the issuer of the note and the holder at the time the note
is issued. For example, if the holder has incurred risk by contributing
capital subject to the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others,
that would indicate that the invested funds are "risk capital" and
that the note in question is a security. 63 The Ninth Circuit developed
the "risk capital" approach,64 which was adopted by the Fourth6S
and Sixth 66 Circuits.
.
1991]

61.

62.

63.
64.

65.

672 (10th Cir. 1983) (shares in corporation which owned discotheque were not
"securities" within meaning of securities law because shareholders were actively
involved in operating and managing discotheque and thus their shares were
not incidentals of an investment which derived profit from others).
See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345-46 (lIth Cir. 1982) (the "economic
realities" test is appropriate to determine whether transaction involving stock
in corporation is "securities transaction" or an "investment contract" under
federal securities laws).
See Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centrex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985).
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities, supra note
7, at 414.
Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 431-34 (9th
Cir. 1978) (promissory note and other documents given to lender for commercial
construction loan to finance shopping center was not a security within the
meaning of the federal securities laws since there was no investment of risk
capital); United California Bank v. T.H.C. Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 135859 (9th Cir. 1977) (notes given bank by climate control subcontractor were not
securities since the totality of the deal was considered to be low risk, notes
had only one-month maturity and there was an absence of risk capital since
risk was limited to that associated. with lending money); Great Western Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1976) (ten-month renewable
note given to lender in connection with loan agreement did not constitute a
security because the funding party did not invest "risk-capital").
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1989) (certificates of
deposit issued by state-chartered savings and loan association in Maryland were
not considered investments and, therefore, were not securities because the state
had comprehensive regulatory system applicable to the association which limited
risk associated with the transaction).
Prior to the Tafflin decision, the Fourth Circuit had applied both the
"literal approach" and the Howey test in determining whether an instrument
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2. Does Maturity Exemption Apply to Demand Notes?
As mentioned previously, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts have
language which exempt notes possessing a short (less than nine
months) maturity from some of the more rigorous regulatory provisions of those Acts. 67 The instruments listed in § 3(a)(IO) of the
1934 Act, which are not considered securities if they have a maturity
at the time of issuance not exceeding nine months, are currency,
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and banker's acceptances. The 1933
Act's short-term exemption, found in § 3(a)(3), lists the same instruments, but differs from the 1934 Act language by adding that the
instrument must "arise out of a current transaction or the proceeds
. . . used for current transactions . . .. " The short-term nature of
these instruments is regarded as being a sufficient safeguard to
investors, making application of the securities acts superfluous. 68
Many of the federal circuit courts have agreed that the basic inquiry
of whether a note instrument falls within the maturity exception is
whether the note constitutes an investment, since Congress' intent
was to protect investors from fraud. 69
Traditionally, the SEC has narrowly construed the 1933 Act's
exemption for short-term debt instruments. 7o Using the legislative

66.

67.
68.
69.

70.

was a security under the federal securities definitions. See Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974) (sale of
all outstanding stock of insurance company strongly presumed to be a sale of
a security since the term "stock" is found within the literal definition of
security); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1970)
(sale of production payment, a financing device frequently used in oil and gas
industry, was an investment contract and, therefore, considered a security under
Securities Acts).
See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (6th Cir. 1981) (loan participation agreement executed
between a bank and another financial institution did not constitute a security
under the "risk capital" test since it was characterized as a commercial loan
and not an investment). The Union Planters court applied the "risk capital"
test as a means of interpreting the economic reality factors of the Howey test.
[d. at 1182.
See supra notes 37-66 and accompanying text.
See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04[5] at 65.
See, e.g., C.N.S. Enters., Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354,
1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ("The ultimate question is
whether the plaintiffs are simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who
are not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a securities transaction who
are protected."); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) (in order that investors might be
protected, only promissory notes that are investments fall within the maturity
exception); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.) (the
investment or commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability
of the Act), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 65-66.
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history of § 3(a)(3), the SEC has interpreted the maturity exemption
to apply only to:
prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not
ordinarily purchased by the general public .... [and] issued
to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational
business requirements .... "71
Commercial paper is designed to finance the short-term72 credit needs
of large corporations or banks.73 As such, this instrument is usually
issued by only top-rated 74 entities and purchased with large amounts
of cash by only sophisticated investors. Therefore, regulation of these
instruments has been considered unnecessary by Congress and the
SEC. Although neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act contain the
term "commercial paper, "7S the federal circuit courts have generally .
followed the SEC's interpretation. 76

D.

Blue Sky Laws
The issue of determining whether notes are securities and the
application of the maturity. exemption to demand notes have also
arisen in the context of state securities acts (or "blue sky laws").77
For example, each state has enacted its own definition of a security. 78
71. [d. (quoting Sec. Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) , 2045).
72. The maturities for commercial paper typically range from 2 to 270 days. See
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 68.
73. [d.
74. Both Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation assign
ratings to commercial paper issuers. [d.
75. However, the 1933 Act states that, for the exemption to apply, the note must
"arise[] out of a current transaction." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S~C.A. §
77c (1988). This wording, which does not appear in the 1934 Act, could be
interpreted to refer to commercial paper.
76. See, e.g., Holloway v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772,778 (10th
Cir. 1989); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 775-77 (D.C. Cir.
1981); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795,
800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir .), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). See
also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74-75 (Stevens, J., concurring);
BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 66.
77. See supra note 14.
78. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deering 1968 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 7302(13) (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 517.02(17) (1987 & Supp. t"991);
70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-102(t) (1992). However, the Uniform Securities
Act aided in the standardization of state securities regulation. See 1 Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) , 5601 for text of Uniform Securities Act. Regional variations
existed in blue sky laws which led to the drafting of the Uniform Securities
Act in the 1950's. See BLooMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, at § 4.04 at 64.
Presently, thirty-seven jurisdictions, including Maryland, have adopted the
Uniform Securities Act. [d.
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However, the definition of a security under many state statutes closely
parallels that found in the federal securities acts.79 Both state and
federal courts in Maryland, for example, have found that the definition of a security under the Maryland Act is identical to the
definition found under the federal securities acts.80
The Maryland Act also contains an exemption for short-term
securities which combines the wording of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
but specifically limits the exemption to commercial paper. 81 Before
the Reves decision, no Maryland state court82 had specifically dealt
with the question of whether demand or promissory notes were
considered securities under the Maryland Act. But an Attorney
General's Opinion 83 had concluded that certain promissory notes were
considered securities because the notes did not constitute commercial
paper and, hence, the Maryland short-term maturity exemption was
not applicable. 84 Recently, using the Reves criteria, the Court of

79. Compare 1933 Act § 3(a)(10) with MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601
(1985 & Supp. 1992) and Uniform Securities Act § 402(a) (contained in I Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 5601).
80. See O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Md. 1982). The Maryland
Securities Act is codified as MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11 (1985 &
Supp. 1990) [hereinafter cited as the Maryland Act). For a discussion of the
history of the Maryland Act, see Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 400
A.2d 455 (1979). The Maryland Act defines a "security" at § 11-101(P) and
lists exempt securities at § 11-601.
81. Section 11-601(10) of the Maryland Act states:
The following securities are exempted from §§ 11-205 and 11-501 of
this title:
(10) Any commercial paper which arises out of a current transaction
or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current
transactions and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within
nine months of the date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal of such paper which is likewise limited, or any guarantee
of such paper or of any such renewal.
MD. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601(10) (1985 & Supp. 1990).
82. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland specifically addressed the
question of whether a promissory note is a "security" under the securities laws
in Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1977). In Oliver, the district
court held that a promissory note issued by the defendant in exchange for the
purchase of the plaintiff's stock was not an "investment." The court found
that the defendant was attempting to divest himself of his interest in the
business and was not "investing" by acquiring the promissory notes. Consequently, the note was not considered a "security" within the meaning of the
Securities Acts. Oliver, 426 F. Supp. at 1087.
83. See 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 377 (1972) (stating that promissory notes do not, per
fall within the exemption provided for short-term securities in the Maryland
Act).
84. Several commentaries have been written on the subject of determining whether
notes are securities under the Maryland Act. See generally Comment, Municipal

se,
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Appeals of Maryland held that promissory notes issued by a nonprofit corporation were considered securities under the Maryland
Securities Act. 8S
III.

FACTS OF THE REVES CASE

The Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc.
("Co-op") raised operating funds by selling promissory notes instead
of obtaining funds from traditional borrowing sources such as banks.86
This "Investment Program" was offered to members of the Co-op
and the general public through advertisements in the Co-op's newsletter. 87 Purchasers exchanged cash for promissory notes, which were
payable on demand and offered higher interest rates that those paid
by local financial institutions. 88
Although Co-op advertised its note to prospective purchasers as
"Safe . . . Secure . . . and available when you need it, "89 it filed a
petition for bankruptcy in 1984. 90 A class consisting of note holders
filed suit against Arthur Young & Co. (the predecessor of Ernst &.
Young), auditors of the Co-op's 1981 and 1982 financial statements,
charging that the auditors had "intentionally failed to follow generally accepted accounting principles in its audit. "91 The class alleged
that these demand notes constituted securities and sought recovery
through the anti-fraud provisions of both federal 92 and state law. 93

85.

86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

Securities and State Securities Laws: A New Look, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 558
(1984); Comment, Blue Sky Law & Practice: An Overview, 4 U. BALT. L.
REv. 1 (1974); Comment, A Prospectus on Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD.
L. REv. 289 (1963).
Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Maryland Securities Commissioner, 320 Md. 313,
577 A.2d 783 (1990). The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that: 1)
the investment was essentially motivated by the expected profit to be generated
from the notes; 2) the plan of distribution of the instrument existed in a
ci. ::umstance of common trading for speculation or investment; 3) a reasonable
public expectation existed that the notes were securities and 4) there was a lack
of another regulatory scheme that would reduce risk in acquiring the notes.
Caucus, 320 Md. at 326-29, 557 A.2d at 789-91.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 53 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 V.S. 56 (1990).
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 59 (1990).
The rate of interest changed periodically, but those changes were announced
in Co-op's newsletters. Arthur Young, 856 F.2d at 53.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 59.
Id. The value of the notes at the time of bankruptcy totaled over $10 million.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 77q (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); 15 V.S.C.A. § 78j (West 1988
& Supp. 1991).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-42-106 (1990).
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At trial, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas determined that the demand notes were secu'rities under
both federal and state law and awarded the class a $6.1 million
judgment. 94 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the demand notes
were not securities, under federal law because they failed the Howey
test, nor were they securities under state law because the "demand
nature of the notes is very uncharacteristic of a security. "9S The
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to address the federal issue" and
reversed the Eighth Circuit. 96
IV.

HOLDING OF THE REVES CASE

A.

Test Applied to Notes

The Supreme Court held that the demand notes issued by the
Co-op were securities. In making this determination the, plurality
adopted the Second Circuit's "family resemblance" test because it
"provide[d] a more promising framework for analysis" than the
"investment versus commercial" test. 97 The Court tejected the Howey
test because it merely determined whether an instrument was an
"investment contract," which is an inappropriate measure for notes. 98
Under the "family resemblance" test adopted by the Court, a
rebuttable presumption99 exists that a note is a security.lOo This
presumption may be rebutted by proof that either the note resembles
an instrument considered a non-securitylOl or that the note possesses
94. Robertson v. White, 653 F. Supp. 851, 852 (W .0. Ark. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Reves v. Ernst & Young,494 U.S. 56 (1990).
95. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 55 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
96. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 59-60 (1990).
97. [d. at 65.
98. However, this rationale seems to be a departure from the Court's earlier
statement that the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that run
through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." Forman, 421 U.S. at
852. See infra notes 137-142 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Court's analysis on this issue.
99. [d. at 63 n.2, discusses the Second Circuit's interpretation of the "family
resemblance" test. The test limited the presumption of notes as securities to
only notes with a term of more than nine months. If a security had a term of
less than nine months, it was not considered to be a "security." This interpretation was apparently based on the statutory exclusion for notes with a
maturity of less than nine months found in § 3(a)(I0) of the 1934 Act. [d.
100. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64.
101. In Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.
1976), and Chemical ,Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984), the courts list several examples of
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the characteristics of anon-security .102 Applying this test to the Coop's notes, the Court concluded that they did not bear a "family
resemblance" to a non-security; therefore, they retained the presumption of being securities.103
Bringing greater certainty to application of the "family resemblance" test, the Reves Court adopted four factors that characterize
securities. 104 The first factor is the motivation of the sellers and
buyers of a note. If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the
general use of a business enterprise and the buyer's interest is
primarily in the profit to be generated by the note, then the instrument is likely to be considered a security. If, on the other hand, the
note is sold to aid in the purchase of a specific asset for commercial
use or a consumer good (such as a residence), the note is not
considered a security. The Court determined that only "investmentfor-profit" motives would result in the investment being deemed a
security. The second factor is the "plan of distribution." An instrument would not be a security if the "plan of distribution" does not
include common trading for speculation or investment. Even if the
notes are not traded on an exchange, the Court determined that
instruments offered or sold to a "broad segment of the public" will
satisfy the common trading element. los The reasonable expectations
of the investing public constitutes the third factor. In order for a
note not to be characterized as a security, the public must not be
led to believe that the note is a security. The last factor is whether
there exists an alternative regulatory scheme. If there is such a scheme
which significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, the note is not
considered a security.l06 If, upon evaluation of these four factors,
1991]

102.
103.
104.

105.

106.

notes that are "non-securities." The list includes notes evidencing consumer
financing, home mortgages, or "character" loans to bank customers; shortterm notes secured by a lien on a small business or an assignment of accounts
receivable; notes which formalize an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary
course of business; and loans by commercial banks for current operations. In
deciding whether another category should be added to the list of "nonsecurities," courts should compare the characteristics of the questioned instrument to the four factors applied by the court in determining whether a
transaction involves a "security." Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 939.
See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
[d. at 67-69.
[d. This factor does not mean that the instrument must be traded on an
exchange. See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 59. The Supreme
Court cited SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), which
involved an investment contract for oil and gas leases. In citing this case, the
Reves court implied- that an instrument did not have .to be traded on an
exchange in order to be "commonly traded." [d.
See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificates of deposit
issued were not considered to be securities, since they were insured by the
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the note in question bears a family resemblance to something which
is not a security, then the note is exempt from securities regulation. I07
The Co-op demand notes were examined in light of the four
factors to determine their "family resemblance." First, the Court
found the notes were sold in an effort to raise capital and were
purchased in order to earn interest. 108 This parallelled the "investment-for-profit" scenario which was considered to be characteristic
of a security.l09 Second, as to the plan of distribution, the demand
notes were not traded on an exchange, but over an extended period
of time to a broad segment of the public. Such a plan of distribution
was held to be all that was necessary to establish the requisite
"common trading" of the instrument, which is indicative of a
security. Third, the public's reasonable perception of the notes indicated that they were securities. IIO The notes were considered securities because the Court found persuasive the evidence that the Coop characterized the notes to prospective purchasers as investments.
The Court determined that the public's usual understanding of a
note is that it is a security or investment. 11I Lastly, the Court found
no risk-reducing factors, such as the existence of an alternative
regulatory scheme, which would avoid the need for federal regulation. 1I2

B.

Application of Maturity Exception

1.

Plurality Opinion

While the entire Court agreed upon the formulation and application of the "family resemblance" test,1I3 there was divergence of

107.
108.
109.
110.

III.

112.
113.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial federal banking regulations).
Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
[d. at 67-68.
[d. at 68.
[d. at 69.
Generally, this factor presents a much more complicated scenario. See generally
BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 61 ("A securities law professor
would recognize that the sale of orange groves, chinchillas and the like under
circumstances involving an investment contract is a security and expect to
receive a prospectus, but would the average investor to whom securities of this
nature are offered?").
The notes were uncollateralized, uninsured and, unlike the certificates of deposit
in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), were not insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Reves, 494 U.S. at 69.
Both the majority and the dissent agree that the test to be applied for
determining whether a note is a "security" is the "family resemblance" test.
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65 and 77.
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opmlOn about the application of the maturity exception to the
demand notes. The plurality concluded that the statutory exemption
for notes with maturities of less than nine months did not apply to
the Co-op's demand notes. Rejecting the dissent's interpretation ll4 of
the immediate maturity of the demand notes, the plurality found the
dissent's conclusion to be incorrectly based on state liS rather than
federal law. The plurality determined that state law cannot be used
to determine a federal question,II6 and that allowing state law to
define a note's maturity would nullify Congress' intent that there be
consistent application of the securities laws. The plurality reasoned
that even if literal effect were given to the words of the maturity
exception, the Co-op's demand notes did not fall within the statute's
terms because "demand notes do not necessarily have short terms."JJ1
The Court explained a demand could be made on a demand note
immediately or it could be made long after nine months. liS
Because of this ambiguity, the plurality interpreted the exclusion
in accordance with the statute's purpose. 1I9 The plurality stated that
Congress' purpose in the securities acts was to ensure that investments, unless specifically excluded, were to be regulated by the
114. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's
rationale.
115. Arkansas' statute of limitations law deems a demand note to be immediately
due such that an action can be brought at any time without any other demand
than the suit. Reves, 494 U.S. at 71-72. The plurality rejected the Co-op's
argument that the demand notes fall within the "plain words" of the securities
exemption because the argument was based on Arkansas' statute of limitations
laws. Id. at 72-73.
116. Reves, 494 U.S. at 72. But see, Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595, 598-99 (4th
Cir. 1989) (discussed supra note 65).
117. Reves, 494 U.S. at 72. The majority determined that "maturity" could be
defined as being immediate, because demand could be made immediately.
118. Id. Maturity could be viewed as being longer than nine months, since demand
could be made many months into the future.
119. Several circuit courts have reasoned that demand notes do not fall under the
short-term exemptions of the Securities Acts. See, e.g., Holloway v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (10th Cir.) (relying on
legislative history, the court held exception in statutory definition for shortterm notes is limited to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type
not ordinarily purchased by the general public), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 386
(1990); Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 492 n.l
(7th Cir. 1984) (generally, a demand note does not fall under the short-term
exemption of the Securities Acts); SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751 F.2d
529, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (notes with maturities of only three or six months,
sold by defendants pursuant to their commercial paper program to small
investors, were not considered exempt from registration under the short-term
exception of the Securities Act); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d
770, 777-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (promissory note given in exchange for funds
advanced in anticipation of securing a limited partnership interest constituted
a "security," even though it was less than nine months' duration).
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securities acts. It then held that the Co-op notes did not specifically
fall within the maturity exclusion and, therefore, should be regulated
as securities. 120

2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens' concurring opInIOn followed the plurality in
finding that the maturity exception did not apply to the demand
notes, but his reasoning was based on the unanimous rejection of a
literal reading of the maturity exception by the lower federal courts. 121
Justice Stevens noted that the courts of appeals have historically
. interpreted the maturity exceptions to include only commercial paper
and not investment securities. l22 Justice Stevens concluded that if all
circuits agreed that the maturity exception was reserved for only
commercial paper, it was for Congress, not the Supreme Court, to
disturb this settled construction. 12l •

3.

Dissenting Opinion

The four dissenters l24 believed the Co-op's demand notes fell
within the short-term maturity exclusion of § 3(a)(1O) and, therefore,
should not be considered securities. 12s The dissent's conclusion was
based on the common understanding of a demand note's maturity.
Relying on legal dictionaries, treatises and case law, the dissent found
a consensus that a note payable upon demand was considered to be
immediately due. 126 This being the case, the dissent determined that
demand notes would fall within the maturity exception, since their
maturity would be, by definition, less than nine months.
The dissent applied statutory construction and "well settled state
law" in formulating its opinion. 127 It maintained that the terms
"note" and "maturity" have been "terms of art in the legal profession for centuries" and that in construing these terms, the "common
understanding of those terms at the time of the statute's creation"
should be used. 128 The fact that the vast majority of state courts
adopted the view of the immediate maturity of demand notes is
persuasive support for the dissent's reasoning. 129
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 73.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 73-74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 74.
Id.
The Justices in dissent included: Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia.
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 76-82 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 76-78.
Id.
Id. at 77.
The dissent contends that "[w]elI settled state law can inform our understanding
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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court has failed to establish predictability in
determining whether demand notes are securities. Reves has contributed not only to the uncertainty which issuers of demand notes face,
but also to that entailed in interpreting the maturity exceptioIls 130 of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Unfortunately, it appears .that too much
attention was placed on the outcome particular to this case and not
enough attention was placed on articulating tests which could be
consistently applied to arrive at proper outcomes in the future.

A. Likely Problems in the Application of the New Test
In choosing the "family resemblance" test, the Supreme Court
furnished an all encompassing method for determining if a note falls
outside the securities regulations. Not only did the Court adopt a
list of instruments that are to be considered non-securities, but it
also allowed for expansion of the list if instruments meet the fourfactor test. In choosing a new test, however, the Court created new
problems of interpretation for courts attempting to apply the Reves
decision.
A potential difficulty for courts that apply the Reves decision is
determining the weight to assign each of the four factors described
by the Court. J3J Because it used the qualifying terms "strong resemblance" and "sufficiently similar, "132 the Court probably would not
require each of the four factors to be present for a note instrument
to be considered anon-security. 133 The Reves Court, however, failed
to determine the status of a note instrument that possesses some,
but not all of the factors. If all of the factors are not required for
a note to bear a resemblance to something which is not a security,
then which of the four factors must be present in order to come to
this conclusion?

130.

131.
132.
133.

of what Congress had in mind when it employed a term it did not define."
Reves, 494 U.S. at 79 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989» (since no definition existed in the statute, the
domicile status of twin babies born off the reservation was determined using
Congressional intent for the word "domicile," which was considered federal
and not state in nature).
The terms "maturity exclusion," "maturity exemption" or "maturity exception" are used interchangeably and refer to both § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act and
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text for
explanation of these statutes.
See BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 62.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
But, it is important to keep in mind that the Reves Court found that the Coop's notes satisfied all of the factors presented.
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Similarity to Old Test

Reves' rejection of the Howey test is unfounded. The Court
reasoned that relying on the same test for analyzing notes as the test
used to analyze investment contracts would "make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous."134 The terms
"investment contracts" and "notes," however, are both listed as
separate instruments in the definition of security under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. This fact merely indicates "that the tests for the two
instruments need not be the same, not that they cannot be the
same. "135 Notes and investment contracts could both be viewed as
types of contracts. 136
The rejection of the Howey test is surprising in light of the
similarity between the Howey test and the family resemblance test.
The instructional factors added by the Court to the "family resemblance" test are surprisingly similar to the elements of the Howey
test. The first factor in the Reves test questions whether the parties
are seeking an investment from their outlay of funds or if there is
another (commercial) purpose. The first element of the Howey test
also asks if the purchaser of the instrument is seeking an investment
through the outlay of money. 137
The second factor of the Reves test requires a common trading
of the instrument or, as the Court found in Reves, distribution to a
broad segment of the public. This sounds similar to the second
element of the Howey test which requires a common enterprise. Both
factors involve offers or sales to a broad segment of the public.
The third Reves factor involves the reasonable expectation of
the public that the notes are investments. This factor relates to the
first and third prongs of the Howey test. Under the Howey test, if
a purchaser of an instrument views the transaction as an investment,
in that they are expecting profits, the first and third prongs would
be met.
Although the Howey te~t does not contain a prong which looks
to whether an alternative regulatory scheme exists to protect the
investor, the Supreme Court has applied this test in several cases
where the Howey test was also applied. 138 The reasoning is that the
134. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.

681, 692 (1985».
135. Gordon, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69

TEX. L. REv. 383, 390 (1990) (emphasis in original).
136. A major difference between the two types of instruments is that notes usually
pay a fixed rate of interest and investment contracts usually do not. Id.
137. See supra notes 39-42 for explanation of the Howey test.
138. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (presence of ERISA "severely
undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory,
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alternative regulation renders the protection of the Acts less necessary.
The only element of the Howey test not specifically mentioned
in the Reves test was the need for the profits to be obtained "solely
from the efforts of others." But, this test is inherent in the nature
of promissory notes. The purchaser of a promissory note can only
receive a return through the efforts of the seller of the note, when
the purchaser is paid the interest due. Overall, the elements of the
two tests appear to be the same.
Because the elements of the new test are essentially identical to
the elements of the Howey test, the Reves court could have used the
Howey test and avoided articulating a new test. The "family resemblance" test, as applied by the Reves court, consists of new, uninterpreted language. The Howey test has been applied for several
years and requires less interpretation. There appears to have been
little consistency gained, but much confusion added by applying a
new test when the Howey test was suitable.
1991]

c. Application of Maturity Exemption to Demand Notes
The second issue in the Reves decision which raised more questions than it answered was the plurality's interpretation of the maturity of the Co-op's demand notes. Relying on the interpretation
that Congress intended to protect the public through regulating
investments,139 the Court held that the short-term exception of the
Securities Acts did not cover the Co-op's demand notes. However,
this interpretation of the maturity exclusion raises the question of
how to determine when a demand note's maturity is short-term (less
than nine months).
The Reves decision bequeaths a strong presumption that notes
are securities, since it fails to specify guidelines for determining when
the maturity exception applies. The plurality criticized the dissent for
applying state law, rather than federal law, to determine the maturity
of a note, because of the possibility of differing results in each
state. l40 However, the plurality did not specify what criteria should
compulsory pension plans"); Marine Bank v. Webster, 455 U.S. 551 (1982)
(since certificate of deposit insured by the FDIC, it is unnecessary to subject
issuers to liability under Securities Acts).
139. As stated previously, the Court's interpretation of Congressional intent in
enacting a sufficiently broad definition of "security" was "to encompass
virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment." Reves, 494 U.S.
at 61. The broad scope of the security definition was used to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market and provide the widest
protection possible for the public. [d. at n.l (quoting United Housing Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975».
140. Reves, 494 U.S. at 71.
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be applied to determine whether a particular note would be "shortterm" under jederallaw.
The only guidance offered is the list of instruments specified as
falling within the short-term maturity exclusion of the statutes. 141 But
just as in the case of the Reves demand notes, it may not be clear
whether the instrument matches the Court's list. There is no longer
an implicit understanding of the phrase "short-term." To further
complicate the issue, the common understanding of an instrument
may be overcome by public policy considerations to protect investors.142 Any legitimate exemption from the securities' regulation is,
therefore, more difficult to determine.
Some guidance might have been provided in the last sentence of
the plurality's opinion, which suggested that the intent of the parties
be examined. 143 But such a suggestion, without more explicit instruction, only causes additional confusion. The Co-op's demand notes
were not considered to have an immediate maturity, presumably
because the Court determined that the parties did not contemplate
that demand would be made within nine months. The question then
becomes how to determine a party's state of mind. l44 Should each
purchaser's intent be scrutinized individually or, if sold to a broad
segment of the public, should a "collective state of mind" be
assessed?14S
Even if intent can be proved, an agreement between the parties
might preclude application of the Securities Acts entirely. To have
the short-term maturity exemption apply, it must be precisely invoked. It appears that the Court would require that the maturity of
the note be written into the instrument or that both parties contemplate demand be made within the statutory period. l46 In Marine Bank
v. Weaver,147 however, the Court concluded that the certificate of
deposit given for a promise to pay a percentage of profits was a
"unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties" and was
not considered a security. Therefore, this type of "limited" arrangement would not fit the definition of a security, since it would not,
141. See supra note 11 for text of short-term maturity exemption of the 1933 Act.
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for discussion of investor protection
rationale of Securities Acts.
143. The sentence states:
"[a]lthough the result might be different if the design of the transaction suggested that both parties contemplated that demand would
be made within the statutory period, that is not the case before us."
Reves, 494 V.S. at 73. Since this statement goes beyond the facts before the
Court, it would be considered dictum.
144. See COX ET AL., supra note 42, at 207.
145. Id.
146. Reves, 494 V.S. at 73.
147. 455 V.S. 551 (1982).
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be a "common enterprise," under the Howey test, or "commonly
traded," as required by the Reves test.
Although attempting to merely narrow the scope of the shortterm maturity exception, the Reves opinion leads to an extreme
position-either completely constricting or expanding the breadth of
the exception. On one hand, Reves could be interpreted to have
narrowed the maturity exception without disregarding it completely. 148
Complete dismantling of the maturity exception did not appear to
be the Reves Court's intent. In light of the significance the plurality
placed on protection of investors, however, if a situation arose where
the short-term nature of the instrument was not a sufficient safeguard
against unscrupulous activity, the Court might well disregard the
maturity exception, in favor of the ultimate purpose of the Securities
Act. 149 Also, lack of guidance on how intent is to be proved, coupled
with the difficulty in proving intent, is likely to preclude any notes
from falling within the maturity exception.
At the other extreme, the short-term maturity exception could
be applied to all demand notes. There is no prohibition which would
prevent circuit courts from creating an administrative rule of convenience that would view all demand notes as short-term, absent
evidence of intent to the contrary.
VI.

IMPACT

Lack of clarity in the opInIOn defeats the Court's efforts to
create uniformity. The Reves court was faced with choosing between
a bright-line or a flexible rule when establishing the tests to be
148. Some circuit courts have also applied a narrow construction of the maturity
exemption. See, e.g., Zabriski v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (lOth Cir. 1974)
(maturity exceptions are limited to only prime quality negotiable commercial
paper of the type not ordinarily purchased by the general public); SEC v.
Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 524 (5th Cir. 1974) (a literal
reading of the definition of "security" is compatible with the policy of strictly
construing exemptions from the coverage of the Acts); Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(l972) (the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does
not take it out of the securities acts, unless the note fits into the general
category of "commercial paper").
149. The prefatory language in § 2 of the 1933 Act and § 3 of the 1934 Act would
likely be used to arrive at this conclusion. As Justice Stevens eloquently stated
in his concurring opinion:
[p]ursuant to that language, definitions specified by the Acts may not
apply if the 'context otherwise requires .... ' The context clause thus
permits a judicial construction of the statute which harmonizes the
facially rigid terms of the 9-month exclusion with the evident intent
of Congress.
Reves, 494 U.S. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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applied to note transactions. A bright-line rule would have been easy
to apply, but may not have consistently and accurately fulfilled
congressional intent in each situation. On the other hand, a flexible
rule, designed to consider the individual facts of each situation lacks
clarity. ISO Each strategy has its strengths and weaknesses, but choosing
one or the other adds predictability to courts attempting to apply a
given test .. Unfortunately, it appears the Reves court did not choose
either option, thereby bestowing ineffective standards.
The Reves test does not create a simple analysis. By creating a
new test for determining whether a note instrument is a security,
without providing more detail in how the factors are to be applied,
the test has little predictive value. The same criticism applies which
respect to the lack of specificity revealed for determining whether a
note has a short-term maturity. Predictability of the legal consequences of a company's actions is important in the context of capital
raising by firms. Not knowing legal consequences flowing from
issuance of a financial instrument will increase the costs of issuing
such notes, as issuers seek to account for the uncertain, but potential,
risks of misinterpretation. Knowing the bounds within which a note
will be scrutinized would reduce uncertainty, and allow financial
instruments to reflect true and known costs.
Even if any stability can be gleaned from this decision for the
business community, the decision will likely result in less flexibility
and more litigation for the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the courts. lSI It is likely that investment schemes can be devised that
could be limited in maturity to less than nine months and relate to
current transactions. Under the Reves decision, these schemes would
be exempt from federal securities regulation. Absent additional guidance in subsequent Supreme Court case law, the Reves court has
created a situation that Congress will need to resolve. Removing the
exemption for short-term securities altogether, or specifically limiting
the exemption to a particular class of instruments, such as highgrade commercial paper, IS2 are possible solutions.
150. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2.
151. As the Court commented, an approach founded upon something other than a
per se rule is subject to criticism for lack of clarity. However, this type of
approach has the corresponding advantage of allowing the SEC and the courts
flexibility in clarifying any ambiguity. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2. The more
rigid a rule, the less flexible the interpretation.
152. Even though the term "commercial paper" is not used in either the 1933 nor
1934 Act's "short-term" exemption/exclusion, both the SEC and federal circuit
courts have regarded commercial paper as the only instrument to which the
"short-term" legislation would apply. See BLoOMENTHAL & WING, supra note
14, § 4.04[5] at 65-66. The Commission has stated:
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that Section 3(a)(3)
applies only to (1) prime quality negotiable commercial paper, (2) of
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CONCLUSION

In its haste to provide investor protection, the Court has articulated hollow tests. The Reves court has left too much discretion
with the circuit courts. This discretion could be productive, if contained within a flexible framework which the lower courts are comfortable in applying. Such a flexible framework is the Howey test.
But the Reves court chose to articulate a new test, which requires
new interpretation of factors.
Even if some clarity has been contributed by the factors, the
effort required to apply them outweighs the possible benefits. Although inconsistency within the federal courts in determining whether
a note should be considered a security within the securities acts, has
been reduced by the Reves decision, it has not been eliminated.
Furthermore, the debate over how to determine the maturity of a
demand note has not been quelled, but intensified. The standards
suggested by the plurality for classification of a note under the
maturity exception are far from definite. In fact, this· procedure
leaves the investing public, as well as the courts, with indefinite
criteria that had been previously rejected by the Supreme Court as
"not articulating a meaningful distinction between notes that the Act
purportedly covers and those it does not. "IS3 Overall, the Reves
decision has not clarified, but only added to the controversy.

Sheryl N. Stephenson

a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, (3)
paper issued to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational
business requirements and (4) of a type eligible for discounting by
Federal Reserve banks.
Id. (quoting Sec. Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 2045).
153. BLOOMENTHAL & WINO, supra note 14, § 4.04 at 50, (quoting Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bd., 468 U.S. 137, 152 (1984».

